In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation: In the Heat of Crisis, Chancery Court Scrutinizes Executive Compensation by Cooch, Joseph W.
Journal of Business & Technology Law
Volume 6 | Issue 1 Article 7
In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative
Litigation: In the Heat of Crisis, Chancery Court
Scrutinizes Executive Compensation
Joseph W. Cooch
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jbtl
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons
This Notes & Comments is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Journal of Business & Technology Law by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information,
please contact smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Joseph W. Cooch, In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation: In the Heat of Crisis, Chancery Court Scrutinizes Executive
Compensation, 6 J. Bus. & Tech. L. 169 (2011)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/jbtl/vol6/iss1/7
    
 
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW                                                         169 
 
 
Joseph W. Cooch* 
 
In re Citigroup Inc. Shareholder Derivative 
Litigation: In the Heat of Crisis, Chancery Court 
Scrutinizes Executive Compensation 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In In re Citigroup, Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation,1 the Delaware 
Court of Chancery considered whether Citigroup directors (“the 
Defendants”) were liable under a Caremark2 claim for failing to monitor 
business risk and a waste claim for approving a compensation package for 
its outgoing CEO Charles Prince.3  The court granted the defendant’s 
motion to dismiss on all counts except for the waste claim.4  While refusing 
to dismiss the waste claim, the court enunciated a more lenient waste 
standard than the rule it typically followed, signaling a willingness to 
scrutinize excessive executive compensation packages.5  Such scrutiny will 
raise the possibility of strike suits and impact executive compensation 
decisions by instilling a level of concern over litigation that is currently not 




© 2011 Joseph W. Cooch 
*  J.D. candidate 2011, University of Maryland School of Law.   
 1. 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 2. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). A Caremark 
claim is a shareholder derivative action in which directors can be held liable for loss based on a 
sustained or systematic failure of the board to exercise oversight, such as an utter failure to 
attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system exists. See id. 
 3. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 124, 135. 
 4. Id. at 112. 
 5. See infra Part V.A (arguing that the court failed to afford the Citigroup board business 
judgment deference typically associated with compensation decisions by failing to place the 
burden of establishing a complete failure of consideration on the Plaintiff and by ignoring 
precedent that even consideration that is difficult to value is sufficient to avoid a claim of waste). 
 6. See infra Parts V.B.–C. (arguing that the decision will negatively impact board decision-
making by raising the threat of strike suits and unnecessarily influencing compensation decisions). 
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II. THE CASE 
A. Factual Background  
 
Citigroup is an international financial services company that conducts a 
range of business, including consumer credit and commercial securities, 
banking, and transactional services.7 Citigroup’s formation was the result of 
a merger between Travelers and Citicorp, in the wake of the 1999 Gramm-
Leach-Bliley Act,8 which removed depression-era barriers between 
commercial and investment banking and led to the emergence of several 
financial services conglomerates.9  Among its variety of services, Citigroup 
invested heavily in the real estate market.10  Like other financial services 
giants, Citigroup participated in a real estate market that began to change 
dramatically in the early 1980s, parting with the traditional model of 
lending in which there were social ties between the debtor and creditor in 
favor of a securitized debt market.11 Many extremely profitable years 
followed for Citigroup and its competitors in the financial services, and 
executives of those firms were compensated in an unprecedented manner.  
In 2007, the collapse of the housing market caused a financial crisis, which 
led to major losses for financial institutions such as Citigroup and an 
 
 7. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 112.  See also Citigroup 2007 annual report, available at 
http://www.citigroup.com/citi/fin/data/ar07c_en.pdf. 
 8. The 1999 Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act is also known as the Financial Services 
Modernization Act of 1999.  Pub. L. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (Nov. 12, 1999).  Some 
commentators name this legislative act as a major contributor to the financial crisis because it 
allowed the biggest banks to speculate heavily in the stock markets.  See LAWRENCE G. 
MCDONALD & PATRICK ROBINSON, A COLOSSAL FAILURE OF COMMON SENSE: THE INSIDE 
STORY OF THE COLLAPSE OF LEHMAN BROTHERS 6 (Crown Business 1st ed. 2009); see also 
Michael Siconolfi, Big Umbrella: Travelers and Citicorp Agree to Join Forces in $83 Billion 
Merger, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 1998, at A1. 
 9. See ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL 74–75 (Viking Penguin 2009). 
 10. See Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Second Amended Derivative Complaint at 4, In re Citigroup, 
964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) (No. 3338-CC) (“[A] staggering 43% of Citigroup’s equity was tied 
up in subprime related assets, including $43 billion in credit derivative products.”). Those 
products included collateralized debt obligations collateralized by asset–backed securities. Id. at 5. 
 11. See generally NIALL FERGUSON, THE ASCENT OF MONEY 246–61 (Penguin Press 1st ed. 
2008).  Real estate purchases, both commercial and residential, had historically been financed by 
banks who lent to borrowers that met certain underwriting standards.  Standards typically included 
credit approval, down-payment of a significant percentage of the purchase price, and other 
techniques meant to manage risk.  Securitization of mortgages was also much less common.  See 
id. See also Christine Richard & David Feldheim, Mortgage-Backed Deals are Taking a Novel 
Turn: Bond Issuance Supported by Unconventional Loans is Rising on Wall Street, WALL ST. J., 
Aug. 17, 2004, at C2. 
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ensuing recession that has been described as the worst since the Great 
Depression.12   
 
B. Procedural History  
 
In November 2007, Citigroup announced that declines in its $55 billion in 
subprime related exposure amounted to losses between $8 billion and $11 
billion.13  Shareholders responded by filing a derivative action in the 
Delaware Court of Chancery on November 9, 2007.14  The shareholder-
plaintiffs alleged that Citigroup’s directors and officers breached their 
fiduciary duties by failing to monitor the risk in their subprime assets and 
for failing to properly disclose the corporate exposure to the subprime 
assets owned by Citigroup.15   
The basis for the shareholders’ claims was that the Citigroup board 
ignored a number of “red flags”16 that signaled likely problems in the 
subprime mortgage market in pursuit of short term profits.17  By doing so, 
the directors and managers risked the long term viability of the company.18  
 
 12. Barbara Crane et al., Year-End Review of Markets & Finance 2009, WALL ST. J., Jan. 4, 
2010, at R10. See Fortune 500 2006, available at 
money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune500/snapshots/309.htm (demonstrating $24.5 billion in 
profits in 2006 and an annual growth rate of 17.9% from 1995–2005). 
 13. For a discussion of the rise of subprime real estate investment, see infra Part III.A. 
 14. Plaintiffs’ Derivative Complaint at 12, In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) (No. 
3338-CC). 
 15.  In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d 106, 114 (2009). The court dedicated the bulk of its opinion to 
analysis of the plaintiffs’ Caremark claims.  It described the traditional Caremark claim as a 
breach of the duty of loyalty based on a systemic failure to monitor liability creating activities — 
typically employee misconduct or violations of law.  It described the plaintiffs’ claim as a twist on 
the typical Caremark claim because it sought to hold the defendants liable for failure to monitor 
its business risk.  The court recognized that although the plaintiffs framed the issue as a Caremark 
claim, it was essentially an attempt to hold directors liable for business decisions that turned out 
poorly for Citigroup.  The court adhered to the business judgment rule, which presumes that in 
making business decisions, directors act on an informed basis, in good faith and in an honest 
belief that the action is in the best interest of the company.  Because the plaintiffs did not 
overcome this presumption by alleging interestedness or disloyalty, the bad investments enjoyed 
the protection of the business judgment rule.  Id. 121–25. 
 16. The “red flags” referred to by the plaintiffs were events from May 27, 2005 to October 18, 
2007, including a New York Times article warning of a speculative bubble in the housing market, 
the decline and failure of certain subprime lenders, Freddie Mac’s announcement that it would 
refinance borrowers unable to afford their resetting adjustable-rate mortgages, credit rating agency 
downgrades of subprime bonds, and warnings of spreading mortgage defaults.  See id. at 115. 
 17. Id. at 114 –15.  
 18. Id. 
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The shareholders’ complaint took the form of a Caremark19 claim, which 
creates liability for directors’ failure to monitor based on “a sustained or 
systemic failure of the board to exercise oversight—such as an utter failure 
to attempt to assure a reasonable information and reporting system 
exists.”20 A sustained failure of this kind creates the presumption of bad 
faith.21 
In addition to making Caremark claims, the shareholders also attacked 
Citigroup’s subprime risk-taking with a waste claim.22  They alleged that 
the directors committed waste by allowing Citigroup to purchase $2.7 
billion in subprime loans from the failing banks Accredited Home Lenders 
and Ameriquest Home Mortgage, to invest in structured investment 
vehicles (“SIVs”),23 and to repurchase stock at “artificially inflated 
prices.”24 
The shareholders also alleged that the executive compensation package 
for CEO Charles Prince constituted waste.25  A November 4, 2007 letter 
agreement between Prince and Citigroup established that upon his departure 
from the company, he would receive $68 million, including bonus, salary, 
and accumulated stockholdings.26  In addition, Prince would receive an 
office, an administrative assistant, a car, and a driver for five years until he 
began full-time employment with another company.27  In exchange, Prince 
would sign a non-compete agreement, a non-disparagement agreement, a 
non-solicitation agreement, and a release of claims against Citigroup.28 
On March 7, 2009, the Delaware Court of Chancery considered the 
defendants’ motion to dismiss the Caremark and waste claims for failure to 
state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), and a motion to dismiss for failure to 
plead demand futility under Rule 23.1.29 
 
 19. 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 20.  Id. at 122 (quoting In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971 (Del. 
Ch. 1996)). 
 21. Id. 
 22. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 115. 
 23.  A structured investment vehicle is an “entit[y] set up to invest in a wide range of assets, 
including subprime mortgage securities, with money they raise by selling short-term commercial 
paper.” MARK ZANDI, FINANCIAL SHOCK, 22 (FT Press 2009). 
 24. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 111–12. 
 25. Id. at 115. 
 26. Id. at 138. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. Id. at 112. 
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III. BACKGROUND 
A. Market Overview 
Although the nationwide liquidity crisis has been abated through both 
private and public action,30 the economy continued to struggle through 
2010, and unemployment remains a major problem.31 A number of factors 
contributed to the crisis and its severity, including banking deregulation,32 a 
bubble in the residential real estate market, increased diffusion of risk, and a 
compensation scheme on Wall Street that encouraged short-term risk 
taking.33 The bursting of the global bubble34 in the residential real estate 
market is one of the clearest contributions to the current financial crisis.35   
Easily available credit, among other factors, inflated housing prices.36 
Subprime lending37 became common, and included risky loans such as 
 
 30. The federal government employed a variety of strategies to prevent a complete collapse of 
financial markets.  See generally Sorkin, supra note 9 (detailing strategies taken by Federal 
Agencies in to address the financial crisis of 2008).  In dealing with the first major bank failure, 
the Federal Reserve guaranteed JP Morgan against losses it might incur by purchasing the 
collapsing investment bank Bear Stearns for $2.00 per share.  Id. at 10.  In September 2008, the 
Department of the Treasury developed the Troubled Asset Relief Program in order to purchase 
toxic assets that were wreaking havoc on the financial system.  Id. at 446. 
 31.  See Sara Murray, Orders Grow for Durables; Jobs Still Lag, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 2010, 
at A2 (stating that “[t]he labor market . . . has been slow to rebound from the global economic 
crisis” and that “[t]he December jobs report found that unemployment remained at 10%”). 
 32. See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text. 
 33. Sorkin, supra note 9, at 534.   
 34. A market “bubble” is an irrational market condition characterized by exuberance that 
causes a surge in market prices.  Ferguson, supra note 11, at 120–22.  It typically forms after a 
change in economic circumstances creates new opportunities, which is followed by euphoria and 
overtrading, and then participation by inexperienced investors and those ready to take advantage 
of them.  Id. at 121–22.  A “bubble” will burst when insiders realize that prices are inflated to the 
point where profit is unlikely and begin to exit the market.  Id. at 122.  Outsiders then follow, 
leaving the market and causing prices to fall dramatically. See id.  Additional features shared by 
bubbles are that there is typically an asymmetry of information, free flow of capital between 
countries, and easy credit creation.  Id. 
 35. Id. at 273 (“The subprime butterfly had flapped its wings and triggered a global 
hurricane”). 
 36. Since the New Deal, the government has acted to expand the number of homeowners in 
the United States.  See generally Ferguson, supra note 11, at 248–53 (discussing the government’s 
increasing assistance to homeowners since the 1930s).  This political momentum was largely 
fueled by the cultural importance of homeownership that has developed in the American psyche.  
See ZANDI, supra note 23, at 45 (stating that “[t]he roots of the subprime financial shock begin in 
the American psyche. . . no other country values hearth and home more highly”).  In 2001, the 
Federal Reserve lowered interest rates in order to stimulate the economy to aid recovery from the 
collapse of the dot-com bubble and the impact of the terror attacks of September 11 on the 
economy.  See SORKIN, supra note 9, at 4.  Low interest rates made borrowing cheap, which 
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adjustable rate mortgages (“ARMs”),38 negative amortization ARMs,39  and 
“NINJA” (no income no job no assets) loans.40  A variety of financial 
innovations allowed the diffusion of the risk associated with subprime 
lending,41 and as a result many financial institutions believed that subprime 
investments were essentially risk-free.42  In the years leading up to the 
collapse, executives of the largest companies, and financial institutions in 
particular, were compensated in an unprecedented manner.43  The 
 
encouraged risk taking.  Compare ZANDI, supra note 23, at 63 (identifying easy credit as the 
biggest factor driving the home-buying binge that peaked in 2005 and stating that Fed Chairman 
Alan Greenspan failed to see the risk in his interest rate-cutting approach to central banking), with 
FERGUSON, supra note 11, at 266–67 (rejecting criticism of Chairman Greenspan as failing to 
properly regulate mortgage lending).  Many who would not typically be able to afford real estate 
entered the property market.  See id. at 264–65.  These factors combined to increase property 
ownership from 64% to 69% of all U.S. households from 1995 to 2005, while housing prices rose 
180%.  Id. at 266. 
 37. “Subprime” refers to mortgages for borrowers who do not qualify for prime interest rates 
because of weak credit history, as demonstrated by delinquency, judgments, bankruptcy, low 
credit score, or high loan-to-value ratios.  See Plaintiffs’ Derivative Complaint at 61, In re 
Citigroup, 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) (No. 3338-CC). 
 38. An adjustable rate mortgage is a mortgage loan in which the interest rate is variable and 
changes periodically in relation to an index.  THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD, CONSUMER 
HANDBOOK ON ADJUSTABLE-RATE MORTGAGES, (AUG. 6, 2009) available at http://www.federal 
reserve.gov/pubs/arms/arms_english.htm. 
 39. A negative amortization ARM is an adjustable rate mortgage in which the customer 
makes monthly payments at a rate below the actual interest rate for a certain period of time, during 
which time the unpaid interest is added to the principal balance.  Id. 
 40. Ramsey Su, Why Be a Nation of Mortgage Slaves?, WALL ST. J., Jan. 31, 2009, at A9. 
“NINJA” is a slang term for a mortgage in which the lender ignores standard verification involved 
in mortgage lending such as income, employment, and asset verification.  See NINJA Loan, 
INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/n/ninja-loan.asp (last visited Sept. 21, 2010).   
 41. Securitization allowed financial institutions to transform illiquid debt into a security, and 
sell the security to Wall Street Banks who would convert the security into Residential Mortgage-
Backed Securities (“RMBSs”), Collateralized Debt Obligations (“CDOs”), and other instruments 
that were marketed and sold to other investors.  JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
WALL STREET 573 (Aspen, 3d ed. 2003).  Although these instruments often contained very risky 
elements, they were frequently given triple-A ratings by Moody’s and other ratings agencies.  See 
FERGUSON, supra note 11, at 268–69.  This process diffused risk, and allowed banks, pension 
funds, and even individuals to invest in the real estate debt market.  Id. at 269.  Credit default 
swaps further diffused risk by allowing institutions holding these instruments to insure themselves 
from losses. See MCDONALD & ROBINSON, supra note 8, at 168–69.  Many institutions were 
eager to sell such insurance because they failed to see the likelihood that the instruments would 
result in loss. Id. 
 42. SORKIN, supra note 9, at 5. 
 43. Charles Elson, What’s Wrong with Executive Compensation?, MOTIVATING PEOPLE, Jan. 
2003, available at 
http://www.carlospitta.com/Courses/Gestion%20Financiera%20Internacional/Cases/Executive%2
0Compensation.pdf. 
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seemingly reliable upward trajectory of property values plateaued and 
began to decrease by 2007.44  The “teaser rates” that tempted borrowers 
into adjustable rate mortgages began to reset at significantly higher interest 
rates, and many fell behind on their payments.45  Default rates on subprime 
assets proved to be higher than expected by underwriters, so the variety of 
subprime investments revealed themselves to be overpriced.46 The 
previously-admired47 diffusion of risk throughout the market meant that the 
global financial market in its entirety was susceptible.48 In August 2007, it 
became clear that the collapse of the subprime market would affect global 
markets when a pair of Bear Stearns-owned hedge funds lost $1.6 billion on 
subprime investments.49  The collapse of Bear Stearns itself, followed by 
Lehman Brothers and many other banks unleashed the financial crisis.50  
Some banks survived as a result of the Troubled Asset Relief Program 
(“TARP”), which sought to stabilize financial markets by injecting 
hundreds of billions of dollars into the nation’s largest banks.51 
Some commentators believe that executive compensation schemes that 
developed during this time contributed to the financial crisis.52  In the wake 
of the collapse, public outcry over executive compensation reached fever 
pitch as people witnessed the same financial services executives that they 
 
 44.  FERGUSON, supra note 11, at 270. 
 45.  Id.  By May 2008, approximately 11% of subprime ARMs fell into foreclosure.  Id. at 
271. 
 46. Id. at 271. 
 47. As described above, many thought diffusion of risk created an investment era nearly 
immune from risk. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.  Notably, Secretary of the Treasury 
Timothy Geithner, then acting as Chairman of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, expressed 
concern that it actually created a systemic problem.  See SORKIN, supra note 9, at 65. 
 48. FERGUSON, supra note 11, at 271–73.   
 49. See SORKIN, supra note 9, at 5–6. 
 50. See id. 
 51. See id. at 524.  Citigroup itself received $25 billion in initial TARP funding, but required 
an additional $20 billion in November 2008. Id. at 524, 530. Furthermore, Treasury insured 
hundreds of billions of Citigroup assets.  Id. at 530.  By February 2009, the government was a 
36% stakeholder in the company.  Id.  Whether TARP stabilized financial markets remains a topic 
of debate.  See id. (discussing the purpose of the program to stabilize the financial system versus 
the view of consumers and small business owners that the credit markets continued to 
malfunction). 
 52.  See Editorial, Bankers and their Salaries, N. Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 2008, at A18 (arguing 
that bankers should have more of their own money at risk because the compensation schemes of 
some firms “exacerbated the weaknesses and contributed to market turmoil.” (quoting the Institute 
of International Finance)). 
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blamed for the faltering economy receiving lavish bonuses as a result of 
guaranteed-pay schemes.53 
B. Legal Background 
Compensation of executives of Delaware Corporations is affected by 
numerous laws, including Delaware statutory law, federal regulation, and 
the common law developed by the Delaware Court of Chancery.54 
Delaware law grants corporations the power to “[a]ppoint such officers and 
agents as the business of the corporation requires and to pay or otherwise 
provide for them suitable compensation.”55  Federal law requires that 
compensation of certain executives of publicly traded corporations be 
disclosed and reported to the Securities Exchange Commission.56 Much 
substantive regulation of executive compensation is left to the marketplace, 
where corporations are free to pay executives based on their perceived 
value.57  Executive compensation can also be challenged in the Delaware 
Court of Chancery through claims of breach of the duty of care,58 duty of 
loyalty,59 and waste.60  This section describes a plaintiff’s cause of action 
for waste.  Part 1 describes the requirement for stockholder plaintiffs to 
make pre-suit demand on the corporation and circumstances where such 
demand is excused.61  Part 2 describes the standard that must be met to 
establish a claim of waste.62 Part 3 describes the heightened pleading 
standards required to make claim of waste.63  
  
 
 53.  See Jonathan D. Glater, A.I.G. Agrees to Suspend Millions in Executive Bonus Payments, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2008, at B4 (describing the compensation to former A.I.G. executives as an 
example of excessive greed in corporate America). 
 54. See infra notes 84–88 and accompanying text. 
 55. 8 DEL. CODE ANN. §122(5) (2009). 
 56. 17 C.F.R. § 229.402. 
 57. See Elson, supra note 43 (“CEOs get paid a lot because they are perceived by boards of 
directors as worth a lot.”). 
 58. See In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 55–61 (2005) (analyzing 
whether the process of approval of Ovitz’s compensation package fell below the standard of due 
care or simply failed to follow “best practices”). 
 59. See In re The Limited, Inc. S’holders Litig., No. 17148-NC, 2002 Del. Ch. LEXIS 28, at * 
1 (Del. Ch. Mar. 28, 2002). 
 60. See infra Part III.B.2.  
 61. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 62. See infra Part III.B.2.  
 63. See infra Part III.B.3.  
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 1. The Pre-Suit Demand Requirement and Demand Futility 
Corporate directors, not stockholders, manage the affairs of the corporation, 
including the decision to sue in the name of the corporation.64  Stockholders 
may file a derivative suit, which is essentially an action to compel the 
corporation to sue whoever may be liable to it, including the directors of the 
corporation.65  To encourage intra-corporate remedies and prevent strike 
suits,66 Chancery Rule 23.1 requires that the stockholder first make demand 
on the corporation to initiate the lawsuit itself.67  A board typically 
considers the demand and declines to sue, and this decision enjoys the 
protection of the business judgment rule.68  If a stockholder-plaintiff does 
make demand, and in the likely event that the corporation declines to sue, 
the derivative suit can continue only upon a showing that refusal of demand 
was improper, which is very difficult to accomplish.69 
As a result, shareholder-plaintiffs typically avoid making demand, and 
instead try to establish that they are excused from the demand requirement 
because demand would have been futile.70  The Court of Chancery 
developed the Aronson test to assess demand futility.71 The court held that 
demand is futile where, “under the particularized facts alleged,72 a 
reasonable doubt is created that: (1) the directors are disinterested and 
independent73 [or]74 (2) the challenged transaction was otherwise the 
 
 64. 8 DEL. CODE ANN. §141(a) (2010). 
 65. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811 (Del. 1984). 
 66. A strike suit is defined as “[a] suit (esp. a derivative action), often based on no valid 
claim, brought either for nuisance value or as leverage to obtain a favorable or inflated 
settlement.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1572 (9th Ed. 2009). 
 67. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 811 (citing Chancery Rule 23.1). 
 68. Id. at 813 (citing Zapata v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 784 n.10). For a discussion of the 
business judgment rule, see infra notes 90–91 and accompanying text.   
 69. 8 DEL. CODE ANN. § 141(a) (2010) gives the corporation power to initiate or refrain from 
litigation.  See Zapata Corp., 430 A.2d at 782 n.6  and accompanying text.  See id. at 784 n.10 and 
accompanying text (stating that “the board’s decision [to refuse demand] falls under the ‘business 
judgment’ rule and will be respected if the requirements of the rule are met”).  Only a showing of 
bad faith or interestedness on the part of those making the decision to dismiss the suit can 
establish that refusal of demand is improper.  See id. at 783. 
 70. See Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814. 
 71. See id. at 815–16.  
 72. A shareholder-plaintiff, in attempting to establish demand futility, is subject to a 
heightened pleading standard imposed by Del. Ch. 23.1.  Del. Ch. Ct. R. 23.1 (2010). See also 
infra Part III.B.3. 
 73. The first prong of the Aronson test, which is typically used to challenge interested 
transactions and self-dealing, is not invoked in In re Citigroup. In re Citigroup, Inc. S holder 
Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 136 (Del. Ch. 2009).  In the context of compensation, the first 
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product of a valid exercise of business judgment.”75  Because demand on 
the corporation will typically terminate a shareholder’s case, establishing 
that demand as excused is critical to a plaintiff’s claim.76 
A plaintiff may establish that demand is futile, and therefore excused, 
based on the first prong of the Aronson test by pleading facts that create a 
reasonable doubt whether the directors are disinterested and independent.77 
In the context of executive compensation, the first prong of the Aronson test 
can be met where directors receive some material benefit not enjoyed by 
shareholders of such significance that it is reasonable to question “whether 
that director objectively considered the advisability of the challenged 
transaction to the corporation and its shareholders,” or whether “a director 
stands on both sides of the challenged transaction.”78  In London v. 
Tyrrell,79 for example, the plaintiffs effectively established that demand 
was futile by showing that the directors granted stock options to 
themselves, and were therefore on both sides of their compensation 
transaction.80 
A plaintiff proceeding under the second prong of the Aronson test 
must establish that demand is futile, and therefore excused, by creating a 
reasonable doubt that the challenged transaction was a product of the valid 
exercise of business judgment.81  The business judgment rule is the 
presumption enjoyed by corporate boards that their actions are presumed to 
 
prong is invoked where corporate directors award themselves excessive payment for their 
services.  MCG Capital Corp. v. Maginn, 2010 WL 1782271, at *18 (Del. Ch. 2010).  In 
Citigroup, the challenged compensation is to a departing executive, Charles Prince, rather than 
compensation of directors themselves, leaving the plaintiffs to proceed on the second prong of the 
Aronson test.  In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 136. 
 74. Although the original Aronson test states a conjunctive test, it was later clarified that the 
two prongs were distinct, and demand would be futile where either could be established.  Levine 
v. Smith, 591 A.2d 194, 206 (Del. 1991) (“The point is that in a claim of demand futility, there are 
two alternative hurdles, either of which a derivative shareholder complainant must overcome to 
successfully withstand a Rule 23.1 motion.”). 
 75. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814. 
 76. Grimes v. Donald, 673 A.2d 1207, 1220 (Del. 1996) (“[A] shareholder who makes a 
demand can no longer argue that demand is excused . . . the Board is entitled to have its decision 
[regarding the demanded action] analyzed under the business judgment rule unless the 
presumption of that rule can be rebutted.” (quoting Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 775 (Del. 
Sup. 1990))). 
 77. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814.   
 78. London v. Tyrrell, No. 3321-CC, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS 75, at *13–14 (Del. Ch. June 24, 
2008) (quoting Orman v. Cullman, 794 A.2d 5, 25 n.50 (Del. Ch. 2002)). 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 15–16. 
 81. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814. 
     
J W. C 
VOL. 6 NO.1 2011                                           179 
 
be made on an informed basis, in good faith, and in the honest belief that 
the action taken was in the best interests of the company.82  The business 
judgment rule is a rebuttable presumption, however, and it may be 
overcome by a showing of a lack of good faith,83 gross negligence,84 failure 
to monitor,85 or lack of a rational business purpose (waste).86   
 2. Standard for Establishing a Claim of Waste 
A party challenging executive compensation with a claim of waste in the 
absence of director interestedness must prove demand futility based on the 
second prong of Aronson.87  In the context of waste, “the judicial standard 
is. . . well developed.”88  A claim of waste can overcome the business 
judgment presumption where corporate assets are exchanged for 
consideration so disproportionately small as to lie beyond the range where 
any reasonable person would be willing to trade.89  A wasteful transaction 
is one that serves no corporate purpose or one which “is so completely 
bereft of consideration that it effectively constituted a gift.”90  Typically, 
the Chancery Court acknowledges that waste claims must meet an extreme 
test which is rarely satisfied,91 and that its purpose is to “smoke out shady, 
bad faith deals” rather than create license for judicial scrutiny of arm’s 
 
 82. See Dodge v. Ford, 170 N.W. 668, 682 (Mich. 1919) (describing the high threshold which 
must be met in order to trigger the court’s intervention in the discretion of the directors of a 
corporation).   
 83. A lack of good faith can be established if a director is fraudulent or consciously disregards 
his responsibilities.  See Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5 (Del. 1998); In re The Walt Disney Co. 
Deriv. Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 66–67 (Del. 2006).  For example, directors were found to be 
fraudulent, and therefore demand was excused based on the second prong of Aronson where 
directors intentionally manipulated a valuation by withholding positive information and allowing 
negative information to be known in order to increase the value of their stock options.  London, 
No. 3321-CC, 2008 Del. Ch. LEXIS, at *17–18. 
 84. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985). 
 85. See In re Caremark Int’l Inc., 698 A.2d 959, 967–68 (Del. Ch. 1996). 
 86. Even business decisions that in hindsight were extremely unwise receive the protection of 
the business judgment rule. See, e.g. Shlensky v. Wrigley, 237 N.E.2d 776, 780 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1968) (protecting Chicago Cubs owner from liability for significant losses due to his refusal to 
build lights and schedule baseball games at night).  
 87. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984). 
 88. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. Ch. 2000) (quoting Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 
A.2d 327, 336 (Del. Ch. 1997)). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Ash v. McCall, No. 17132, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 144, at *23 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2000). 
 91. Weiss v. Swanson, 948 A.2d 433, 450 (Del. Ch. 2008) (quoting Zupnick v. Goizueta, 698 
A.2d 384, 387 (Del. Ch. 1997)). 
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length bargains.92  Indeed, the extreme standard for waste “is a corollary of 
the proposition that where business judgment presumptions are applicable, 
the board’s decision will be upheld unless it cannot be ‘attributed to any 
rational business purpose.’”93 
In making the determination of whether a waste claim will survive a 
motion to dismiss for failure to make demand, the court will make a 
substantive review of the challenged transaction,94 and determine whether 
the complaint sufficiently alleges that no consideration was made.95  The 
plaintiff is required to plead facts that raise a reasonable doubt that there 
was a complete failure of consideration.96  What constitutes sufficient 
consideration can be a difficult question in the case of executive 
compensation, and in rejecting motions to dismiss, the Chancery Court has 
noted its discretionary function in analyzing facts.97  
Executive compensation creates particularly difficult analysis given 
the often “ephemeral” nature of the consideration received by a corporation 
in executive compensation packages, especially in stock option plans and 
severance agreements.98  Even in light of this difficulty of valuation in 
dollar terms, the Chancery Court still requires plaintiffs to plead facts 
showing that the corporation “failed to receive any benefit.”99 The 
Chancery Court has recognized even unquantifiable agreements to be 
sufficient consideration in various contexts. In Grobow v. Perot,100 General 
 
 92. In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967 A.2d 640, 656–57 (2008) (stating the rule that 
judicial scrutiny of a claim of corporate waste may not proceed if given the facts pled in the 
complaint, “any reasonable person might conclude that the deal made sense”) (quoting Harbor 
Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 892 (Del. Ch. 1999)). 
 93. In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27, 73 (Del. 2006) (quoting 
Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (Del. 1971)). 
 94. See Lewis v. Hett, No. 6752, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 546, at *8–11 (Del. Ch. 1984) 
(analyzing the facts alleged in the complaint surrounding the compensation of Hett, a board 
member, and refusing to consider an affidavit). 
 95. In re 3Com Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 16721, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *13 (Del. Ch. 
1999). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Lewis v. Vogelstein,  699 A.2d 327, 339 (Del. Ch. 1997) (stating that “[s]ince what is a 
‘well-pleaded’ fact and what is a ‘mere conclusion’ is not always clear, there is often and 
inevitably some small room for the exercise of informed judgment by courts in determining 
motions to dismiss under the appropriate test”).  In Lewis, the Court was also willing to consider 
the fact that one-time option grants were unusual, which led to the conclusion that the 
compensation was sufficiently unusual to dismiss the motion to dismiss in the interest of acquiring 
more evidence.  Id. at 339.  
 98. See In re 3Com Corp., 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS at *14–15.    
 99. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 100. 539 A.2d 180 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
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Motors purchased all of its shares owned by H. Ross Perot, who had 
become a vocal critic of the GM management.101  He received $745 million 
in exchange for his stockholdings and made commitments to General 
Motors to stop criticizing its management, not compete with a GM 
subsidiary, and not purchase GM stock or engage in a proxy contest for five 
years.102  The court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that buying Perot’s 
silence, and various other commitments, constituted waste.103  
 3. The Plaintiff’s Pleading Burden Under Chancery Rule 23.1 
A shareholder-plaintiff seeking to establish a claim of waste must overcome 
the deferential business-judgment prong of the Aronson test, and create a 
reasonable doubt that the transaction meets the extremely stringent standard 
for waste.104 The requirements of Chancery Rule 23.1 make this task even 
more difficult.105 The demand requirement of Chancery Rule 23.1 creates a 
heightened pleading standard that is more stringent than Chancery Rule 
8(a), the general notice pleading standard.106  Although a plaintiff is not 
expected to plead evidence, Rule 23.1 requires greater “particularity” of 
factual detail than the typical notice pleading standard, however, and 
conclusory allegations unsupported by such factual allegations are not taken 
as true.107  While analyzing a motion to dismiss for failure to make 
demand, the Chancery Court will take all well-pleaded facts as true and 
make inferences in favor of the plaintiff that logically flow from the 
 
 101. Id. at 184. 
 102. Id. at 184–85. 
 103. Id. at 189. 
 104. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984).   
 105. Compare Del. Ch. Ct. R. 8(a) (2009) (stating general rules of pleading, which require a 
“short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief”), with Del. 
Ch. Ct. R. 23.1 (2010) (stating that in derivative actions by shareholders, “[t]he complaint shall 
also allege. . . with particularity the efforts, if any, made by the plaintiff to obtain the action the 
plaintiff desires from the directors or comparable authority and the reasons for the plaintiff’s 
failure to obtain the action or for not making the effort”). 
106.  Chancery Rule 8(a) states that  
[a] pleading which sets forth a claim for relief, whether an original claim, counterclaim, 
cross-claim or third-party claim shall contain (1) a short and plain statement of the 
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief and (2) a demand for judgment for 
the relief to which the party deems itself entitled. Relief in the alternative or of several 
different types may be demanded.  
De1. R. Ch. Ct. 8(a) (2009). 
 107. Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 254 (Del. 2000). 
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particularized facts alleged.108  The court will not consider affidavits or 
other materials not included in the complaint.109 
In Lewis v. Hett,110 the shareholders alleged waste, and pleaded 
particularized facts showing that the directors approved a severance 
agreement with an executive who had voluntarily resigned, had no 
employment contract, and served at the will of the board.111 The 
shareholders’ complaint alleged that no consideration had been received in 
exchange for the severance agreement.112  The Chancery Court found the 
pleadings to be sufficiently particularized and to raise a reasonable doubt 
“that the severance payments constitute a gift or waste of corporate assets 
and, therefore, that ‘the challenged transaction was. . . the product of a valid 
exercise of business judgment.”113 
The Court of Chancery faces a highly factual analysis when 
considering a motion to dismiss for failure to make demand.114  A plaintiff 
in shareholder derivative cases often faces problems pleading the necessary 
facts because Rule 23.1 motions precede discovery, so a the Chancery 
Court’s ability to find for the plaintiff is often based on the amount of 
information a plaintiff has before discovery.115  
A lack of information is not always dealt with consistently.116  For 
example, efforts by plaintiffs to overcome a lack of particularized facts with 
 
 108. Id. at 255. 
 109. Spiegel v. Buntrock, 571 A.2d 767, 774 (Del. Ch. 1990). 
 110. No. 6752, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 546 (Del. Ch. May 31, 1984). 
 111. Id. at 10. 
 112. Id. at 10–11. Although an affidavit provided by the defendant added undisputed facts that 
the executive’s resignation was not voluntary and that there was consideration to the corporation, 
the court refused to consider the affidavit, citing Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 (Del. Ch. 1984)  
for the rule that the court may only consider the facts alleged within the complaint.  
 113. Id. at 11 (quoting [citation unavailable]). 
 114. Grobow v. Perot 539 A.2d 180, 186 (1988); Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 338–39 
(Del. Ch. 1997) (stating that because what is a “well pleaded” fact and what is a “mere 
conclusion” is not always clear, there is some small room for the exercise of informed judgment).  
In Lewis, the court considered an executive compensation agreement that had been ratified by the 
shareholders.  Id. at 329.  The court refused to dismiss the claim of waste because one time grants 
to directors seemed sufficiently unusual to require evidence before making an adjudication of their 
consistency with fiduciary duty.  Id. at 339. 
 115. See Lewis, 699 A.2d at 339 (reasoning that although it is difficult to make an inherently 
factual determination on a motion to dismiss, a court cannot allow a waste claim to go forward 
where there is simply an allegation of the facts of the case coupled with a statement that the 
transaction constitutes a waste of assets). 
 116. Compare Harbor Fin. Partners v. Huizenga, 751 A.2d 879, 892 (Del. Ch. 1999) (refusing 
to consider excerpts from newspaper articles about problems in the used car business because the 
plaintiff failed to plead that the articles were relevant to the allegedly wasteful transaction), with 
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industry news about the value of an investment have been deemed an 
insufficient method of overcoming such a lack of facts.117  On the other 
hand, the Chancery Court has acknowledged that because the difference 
between a well pleaded fact and a mere conclusion can be unclear, there is 
some small room for the court to exercise “informed judgment” in 
determining motions to dismiss.118  In Lewis v. Vogelstein,119 the Chancery 
Court refused to dismiss a claim of waste where a stock option plan was 
alleged to have failed to give the corporation assurance that it would receive 
adequate value in exchange for the grant of stock options.120  The court was 
influenced by its intuition that a one-time option grant was sufficiently 
unusual, and refused to dismiss the case because it required more evidence 
before ruling on the claim.121 
IV. THE COURT’S REASONING 
In In re Citigroup, Inc. Shareholder Derivative Litigation,122 the Delaware 
Court of Chancery rejected the plaintiffs’ Caremark claims,123 and then 
assessed whether each of the four following claims of waste would survive 
a motion to dismiss under Delaware law: (1) the compensation agreement 
between Citigroup and Charles Prince (2) Citigroup’s purchase of over $2.7 
billion of subprime assets (3) approving the buyback of stock at inflated 
stock price, and (4) allowing the company to invest in special investment 
vehicles (“SIVs”) that were unable to pay off maturing debt.124   
 
Lewis, 699 A.2d at 338–39 (Del. Ch. 1997) (noting that because it is unclear what the difference is 
between a “well pleaded” fact and a “mere conclusion,” there is “some small room for the exercise 
of informed judgment by courts in determining motions to dismiss” and considering the one-time 
nature of an option grant in ruling on a Motion to Dismiss.). 
 117. Harbor Fin., 751 A.2d at 892 (finding that the plaintiff had not pled facts to support the 
conclusion that no rational person could find the transaction sensible where the plaintiff’s 
complaint included snippets of news articles and quotes from industry competitors describing the 
poor prospects for investors in used car businesses). 
 118. Lewis, 699 A.2d at 338–39. 
 119. 699 A.2d 327 (Del. Ch. 1997). 
 120. Id. at 339. 
 121. Id.  
 122. 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 123. The court dedicated the bulk of the decision to plaintiffs Caremark claims, and refused to 
allow claims that a failure to monitor business risk could create liability under Caremark.  See In 
re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 123–35.  The focus of this case note is the claim of waste, however, so 
the details of the court’s decision regarding the Caremark claims will not be discussed in this 
section. 
 124. The court quickly dismissed the claims of waste based on the investment in SIVs at the 
outset of its discussion of the waste claims. Id. It pointed out that the plaintiffs failed to adequately 
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The Court of Chancery began its analysis by noting that the plaintiffs 
sought to argue demand futility based on the second prong of the Aronson 
test, which requires a plaintiff to plead particularized facts that raise a 
reasonable doubt whether “the challenged transaction was otherwise the 
product of a valid exercise of business judgment.”125  The court also 
enunciated the standard for excusing demand on a claim of waste, stating 
that a plaintiff must “plead particularized facts that lead to a reasonable 
inference that the director defendants authorized  “an exchange that is so 
one sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judgment could 
conclude that the corporation has received adequate consideration.”126  To 
overcome the presumption of good faith, a plaintiff must show that the 
board’s decision was “so egregious or irrational that it could not have been 
based on a valid assessment of the corporation’s best interests.”127 
The Chancery Court first considered whether Citigroup’s repurchase 
of stock constituted waste.128 The plaintiff argued that the Citigroup 
directors’ buyback of stock constituted waste because it approved the stock 
purchase when it was trading at an average price of $53.37, which the 
directors would have known was an inflated price but for their reckless 
failure to consider impending subprime losses.129  The court rejected this 
argument as an “utter [] fail[ure] to state a claim for waste.”130  The court 
emphasized the fact that a purchase of stock at market value was a clearly a 
rational act of business that fell well below the standard for waste.131  The 
court allowed Citigroup’s failure to recognize various “red flags” in the 
 
plead that the challenged corporate activity was the result of board action, as opposed to inaction, 
which is required to excuse demand for a claim of waste. Id. The court alternately pointed out that 
these claims do not create a substantial likelihood of liability for the director defendants because 
the complaint fails to establish the bad faith which would be required to overcome the business 
judgment rule. Id. The court, referring to its discussion of the Caremark claims that it dismissed, 
reasserted that the “red flags” alleged by the plaintiff did not support an inference of bad faith, and 
that the ultimately failing investments fell squarely within the business judgment rule.  In re 
Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 135 n.96 (citing Highland Legacy Ltd. v. Singer, No. 1566-N, 2006 WL 
741939, at *7 (Del. Ch. Mar. 17, 2006)).    
 125.  Id. at 136 (quoting Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 1984)).  
 126. Id. (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 (Del. Sup. 2000)) (quoting In re The 
Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 362 (Del. Ch. 1998))). 
 127. Id. (quoting White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 554 n. 36 (Del. Ch. 2001). 
 128. Id. at 136–37. 
 129. Id. at 137. 
 130. Id. 
 131. The court implied that purchasing stock at market value was not, by definition, waste 
because “the market price–the price at which presumably ordinary and rational businesspeople 
were trading the stock–could [not] possibly be so one sided that no reasonable and ordinary 
business person would consider it adequate consideration.” In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 137. 
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subprime market to fall within the protection of the business judgment rule, 
as it had for the plaintiff’s Caremark claims.132  
The court then began its analysis of the Letter Agreement, which 
reflected the compensation agreement between Citigroup and its CEO 
Charles Prince, by stating that although corporations generally have broad 
discretion to determine compensation of their executives, the outer limit of 
the discretion was the point at which the compensation “is so 
disproportionately large as to be unconscionable and constitute waste.”133  
The court then considered whether the multimillion dollar compensation 
package, contingent on Mr. Prince signing a non-compete agreement, a 
non-disparagement agreement, a non-solicitation agreement, and a release 
of claims against Citigroup was “so one sided” as to constitute waste.134 
The court noted that it had very little information about how much 
additional compensation Mr. Prince received based on the Letter Agreement 
and the actual value of the agreements signed by Mr. Prince.135  It stated 
that, as a result of the lack of information, and because it was required to 
take the plaintiffs’ allegations as true, a reasonable doubt existed that the 
agreement was so one sided that no business person of ordinary, sound 
judgment could concluded that the corporation received adequate 
consideration.136  The court did not provide any reasoning as to why the 
Letter Agreement created such a reasonable doubt, and instead apparently 
relied on the premise that “the discretion of directors in setting executive 
compensation is not unlimited.”137 As a result, the court held that the 
plaintiffs’ adequately alleged that demand was futile based on the second 
prong of Aronson, and refused to dismiss the claim of waste.138 
 
 132. The bulk of the decision was dedicated to an analysis of the plaintiff’s attempt to use a 
Caremark-style claim to essentially circumvent the business judgment rule. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 
123–31.  The plaintiff argued that the director’s failure to recognize “red flags” in the subprime 
market constituted a failure to monitor.  Id. at 124.  The court flatly rejected this argument, 
reasoning that if it were to hold directors liable for suffering losses for failure to foresee market 
downturns, then it would also be required to hold directors liable for failing to foresee market 
downturns and profit from them.  Id. at 131 n. 78. 
 133. Id. at 138 (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 262 n.56 (Del. Sup. 2000). 
 134. Id. 
 135. Id.    
 136. Id. 
 137. See id. (restating the terms of the compensation transaction and simply concluding that 
there is a reasonable doubt as to whether the transaction constituted waste).  
 138. See id.  The court then rejected the Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) 
for failure to state a claim.  Id. at 139.  It reasoned that the pleading demand futility is a higher 
standard than that required to survive a 12(b)(6) motion and cited the rule that “a complaint that 
survives a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 23.1 will also survive a 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, 
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V. ANALYSIS 
Despite a conclusory affirmation of the importance of the business 
judgment rule and a statement that “we must not let our desire to blame 
someone for our losses make us lose sight of the purpose of our law,”139 the 
Chancery Court’s decision in In re: Citigroup creates confusion regarding 
shareholder complaints that executive compensation amounts to waste.140 
The court, in an apparent attempt to vindicate popular anger over executive 
compensation,141 created confusion about directors’ ability to make 
compensation decisions by: (1) enunciating a weakened standard for 
waste;142 (2) raising the threat of strike suits;143and (3) creating 
unnecessary concern over tying executive compensation to long-term 
measures of risk.144 
A. The Court Failed to Afford the Citigroup Board Business Judgment 
Deference Typically Associated with Compensation Decisions 
The court’s decision failed to enunciate the typically strict standard for 
waste and, in doing so, undermined the previous understanding that claims 
of waste in executive compensation decisions receive the same business 
judgment deference as other disinterested board decisions.145  Although the 
court properly stated the standard for determining demand futility on the 
second prong of Aronson,146 it failed to include the strict language typically 
associated with the rule.147   
 
assuming that it otherwise contains sufficient facts to state a cognizable claim.”  Id.  (quoting 
McPadden v. Sidhu, 964 A.2d 1262 (Del. Ch. 2008)).   
 139. Id.  The court had rejected all of the plaintiffs’ claims based on the directors failures to 
respond to “red flags” that signaled the impending subprime financial meltdown.  See also supra 
note 132 and accompanying text. 
 140. See infra Parts V.A–C. 
 141. See Michael J. Biles & Kimberly G. Davis, Keeping Current: Corporate Compensation, 
19 BUSINESS LAW TODAY 1 (Sept./Oct. 2009), available at http://www.abanet.org/buslaw 
/blt/2009-09-10/keepingcurrent-corpcomp.shtml (stating that “[c]ourts are not immune to political 
zeitgeist” in reference to the chancery decision in Citigroup)  
 142. See infra Part V.A. 
 143. See infra Part V.B. 
 144. See infra Part V.C. 
 145. See In re Citigroup Inc. Derivative Litig., 964 A.3d, 136 (Del. Ch. 2009).   
 146.  The second prong of Aronson requires showing that “under the particularized facts 
alleged, a reasonable doubt is created that: . . . the challenged transaction was otherwise the 
product of a valid exercise of business judgment.”  Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 814 (Del. 
Ch. 1984). 
 147. See infra notes 148–53 (demonstrating that the standard stated in Citigroup failed to 
include rigorous language typically associated with analysis of waste claims). 
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The court did not misstate the standard for waste, and much of the rule 
it enunciated was the same rigorous language it had used in previous 
cases.148  Still, it failed to include language that demonstrates that waste is 
an extreme test149 meant to “smoke out shady, bad faith deals”150 that are 
“so completely bereft of consideration that [they] effectively constituted a 
gift.”151 While the court acknowledged the wide discretion given to 
compensation decisions, it focused on the “‘outer limit’ [of] the board’s 
discretion to set executive compensation, ‘at which point a decision is so 
disproportionately large as to be unconscionable and constitute waste.’”152  
Although the court was not incorrect that such an “outer limit” exists, it 
failed to recognize that the outer limit begins where a compensation 
agreement demonstrates a complete failure, rather than an imbalance, of 
consideration.153 
In applying this weakened standard, the court did not grant Citigroup’s 
directors the protection of the business judgment rule in its executive 
compensation agreement, although it had done so for all of Citigroup’s 
other investment decisions.154  Its failure to do so is inconsistent with the 
court’s previous understanding of waste as a “corollary of the proposition 
 
 148. See In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 136 (stating that the plaintiff must “allege particularized 
facts that lead to a reasonable inference that the director defendants authorized ‘an exchange that 
is so one sided that no business person of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the 
corporation has received adequate consideration’” (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 263 
(Del. Sup. 2000) (quoting In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 731 A.2d 342, 362 (Del. 
Ch. 1998))), and stating that the plaintiff must show that the board’s decision was “so egregious or 
irrational that it could not have been based on a valid assessment of the the corporation’s best 
interests” (quoting White v. Panic, 783 A.2d 543, 554 n.36 (Del. 2001)). 
 149. See Weiss v. Swanson, 948 A.2d 433, 450 (2008) (quoting Zupnick v. Goizueta, 698 A.2d 
384, 387 (Del. Ch. 1997)) (finding that the plaintiffs’ claim that, based on the facts alleged by the 
plaintiffs, the grant by the corporation to the defendants meets the extreme test for waste because 
it served no valid corporate purpose). 
 150. In re Lear Corp. S’holder Litig., 967 A.2d 640, 656–57 (2008) (stating the rule that 
judicial scrutiny of a claim of corporate waste may not proceed if given the facts pled in the 
complaint, “any reasonable person might conclude that the deal made sense”). 
 151. Ash v. McCall, No. 17132, 2000 Del. Ch. LEXIS 144, at *23 (Del. Ch. Sept. 15, 2000). 
 152. Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 138 (quoting Brehm v. Eisner 746 A.2d, 244, 262 n.56 (Del. Sup. 
2000) (citing Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1962))). 
 153. Compare infra note 154 and accompanying text, with  In re 3Com Corp. S’holders Litig., 
No. 16721, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *13 (Del. Ch. 1999).  
 154. Compare In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 124 (protecting the directors’ unwise decision to 
invest heavily in subprime assets because the business judgment rule protects decisions made on 
an informed basis in good faith and with an honest belief that the decision was in the best interests 
of the company), with id. at 138 (failing to protect the directors’ decision with regards to Charles 
Prince’s compensation package despite the plaintiffs’ failure to allege a complete lack of 
consideration or business purpose). 
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that where business judgment presumptions are applicable, the board’s 
decision will be upheld unless it cannot be ‘attributed to any rational 
business purpose.’”155  The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims of waste 
for other investment decisions,156 but singled out the severance agreement 
with Charles Prince.157  In doing so, it failed to recognize that the burden is 
on the plaintiff to establish a complete failure of consideration, and that 
even ephemeral consideration is valid under the waste standard.158 
1. The Court Failed to Place the Burden of Establishing a Complete Failure 
of Consideration on the Plaintiff 
The court noted that it had “very little information regarding. . . the real 
value, if any, of the various promises given by Prince.”159  Because it had 
little information, and taking the plaintiffs’ allegations at true, it determined 
that a reasonable doubt existed that the transaction was so one sided that 
“no business person of ordinary, sound judgment could conclude that the 
corporation has received adequate consideration.”160  In doing so, the court 
failed to place the burden of “establish[ing] a complete failure of 
consideration, and not merely the insufficiency of the consideration 
received,” on the plaintiffs.161 
The plaintiffs alleged the following in regards to Charles Prince’s 
Letter Agreement:  
 
 
 155. In re Disney, 906 A.2d 27, 74 (quoting Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 
(Del. 1971)). 
 156. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 136–37.  
 157. Id. at 138. 
 158. See infra Parts V.A.1–2. 
 159. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 138. 
 160. Id. at 136–38.   
 161. Compare In re 3Com Corp. S’holder Litig., No. 16721, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *13 
(Del. Ch. 1999) (requiring that the plaintiff allege facts that establish a complete failure of 
consideration), with In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 138 (quoting Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244, 
263 (Del. Sup. 2000) (requiring an exchange so disproportionate that no reasonable person would 
be willing to trade).  The Citigroup court failed to recognize the language from Brehm that 
immediately followed the quoted statement, which clarified its meaning to be that  
Most often the claim is associated with a transfer of corporate assets that serves no 
corporate purpose; or for which no consideration at all is received.  Such a transfer is in 
effect a gift.  If, however, there is any substantial consideration received by the 
corporation, and if there is a good faith judgment that in the circumstances the 
transaction is worthwhile, there should be no finding of waste, even if the fact finder 
would conclude ex post that the transaction was unreasonably risky.  
Brehm, 746 A.2d at 263. 
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212. The Director Defendants are liable to the Company for 
waste for having approved the Letter Agreement dated November 
4, 2007 between Citigroup and Prince.  Under the terms of the 
Letter Agreement, Prince, who is largely responsible for 
Citigroup’s problems, will still receive a $12.5 million cash 
bonus only $1.3 million less than his 2006 bonus where Prince 
was employed as CEO for the entire year and Citigroup’s stock 
price never dipped below $45.05.  
213. The terms of the Letter Agreement are so one-sided so that 
no person acting in a good faith pursuit of the Company’s 
interests could have approved the terms of the Letter 
Agreement.162 
 
The plaintiff failed to establish that the Letter Agreement with Charles 
Prince was a one-sided transaction completely devoid of consideration.163  
Facts outside the complaint demonstrate that there was consideration in the 
case: Prince signed non-compete, non-disparagement, non-solicitation 
agreements, and a release of claims.164  Even if the court considered only 
the facts in the Plaintiffs’ complaint, nothing in the complaint shows that 
the compensation package symbolized by the Letter Agreement suffered a 
complete failure of consideration.165   
The Lewis v. Hett166 decision provides an example of how a severance 
agreement with a departing executive can constitute a complete failure of 
consideration.167  In Lewis, the complaint alleged that, according to the 
terms of a severance package, significant sums would be paid to Hett, a 
retiring executive, despite the fact that he had voluntarily resigned, had no 
employment contract, and served at the will of the board.168  Such a 
purposeless severance agreement created a reasonable doubt that the 
transaction was the product of a valid exercise of business judgment.169  In 
 
 162. Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Second Amended Derivative Complaint at 212–13, In re 
Citigroup, 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) (No. 3338-CC). 
 163. See id. 
 164. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 138. 
 165.  See Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Second Amended Derivative Complaint at 212–13, In re 
Citigroup, 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) (No. 3338-CC) (alleging that the terms of Prince’s 
compensation package were high despite a decline in the stock value of Citigroup, but failing to 
state facts that there was a complete failure of consideration). 
 166. No. 6752, 1984 Del. Ch. LEXIS 546 (Del. Ch. 1984). 
 167. Id. at *10–11. 
 168. Id. at *10. 
 169. Id. at *10–11. 
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contrast, the plaintiffs in In re Citigroup failed to demonstrate that the 
severance agreement was without purpose, and unlike Hett, Charles Prince 
did not depart from Citigroup on a voluntary basis.170  Nothing in the 
complaint creates a doubt that the Letter Agreement between Citigroup and 
Prince was a complete failure of consideration.171 
2. The Court Ignored Precedent that Demonstrates that Even Difficult to 
Value Consideration is Sufficient to Avoid a Claim of Waste 
The court acknowledged that although Citigroup, under the terms of the 
Letter Agreement with Charles Prince, would receive certain promises 
including a non-compete, non-disparagement, non solicitation agreement, 
and a release of claims.172  Regardless, it held that there was still a 
reasonable doubt that the Letter Agreement was “so one sided” as to 
constitute waste.173  In doing so, the court ignored precedent that 
demonstrates that even where consideration is “ephemeral [and]. . .not 
susceptible to identification and valuation in dollar terms,” the plaintiff is 
not excused from demonstrating facts that the corporation failed to receive 
any benefit.174  For example, paying a premium during a stock repurchase 
was not waste where the corporation received an agreement from an 
outspoken shareholder/director who criticized management to cease from 
doing so and not to compete with the company.175  In addition, the 
Delaware Court of Chancery noted that consideration for a stock option 
plan, namely “continued and greater efforts by employees,” is ephemeral in 
nature, but such ephemeral consideration still must be overcome with a 
 
 170. See Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Second Amended Derivative Complaint at 212–13, In re 
Citigroup, 964 A.2d 106 (Del. Ch. 2009) (No. 3338-CC) (failing to establish that Citigroup 
received no consideration in exchange for Charles Prince’s severance agreement).  
 171. See id. (alleging that Prince would receive a $12.5 million cash bonus (only $1.3 million 
less than his 2006 bonus), despite being “largely responsible for Citigroup’s problems,” and 
stating the conclusion that the transaction was so one-sided that no one acting in good faith could 
have approved the terms of the agreement, but failing to allege that there was a complete failure of 
consideration.). 
 172. In re Citigroup v. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 138 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 173. Id. 
 174. In re 3Com Corp. S’holders Litig., No. 16721, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS 215, at *14–15 (Del. 
Ch. 1999). 
 175. Grobow v. Perot, 539.2d 180, 181, 184–85 (Del. 1988) (finding that GM’s repurchase of 
all of vocal minority shareholder’s stock in exchange for his agreement to stop criticizing GM 
management, not to engage in a proxy contest, and not to compete was not waste and a decision 
protected by the business judgment rule).    
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specific factual allegation that the company has failed to receive any 
benefit.176 
The consideration received by Citigroup is ephemeral in nature.177 
Although the the financial collapse made compensation agreements such as 
these repugnant to the public, corporations need to be free to negotiate with 
their executives, many of whom leave during periods of corporate loss.178  
The In re: Citigroup court failed to give such negotiations the deference of 
the business judgment rule.179 
B. The Court’s Decision Raises the Threat of Strike Suits 
Although the court’s decision afforded Citigroup the protection of the 
business judgment rule when it came to the variety of risk taken by the 
corporate directors and managers,180 the court demonstrated its willingness 
to scrutinize executive compensation packages despite the judicial 
deference they typically enjoy.181  The court’s refusal to dismiss the 
plaintiffs’ claim of waste will raise the threat of strike suits because it 
undermines Chancery Rule 23.1 and enables shareholder plaintiffs to 
survive a motion to dismiss, raising the settlement value of their claim.182 
The demand requirement of Chancery Rule 23.1 and Aronson exists to 
provide a safeguard against strike suits, which can unnecessarily distract 
directors from their duties to manage the corporation.183  The Chancery 
Court views claims of waste for executive compensation in the same light, 
emphasizing that if simply alleging the facts of a transaction and stating that 
 
 176. In re 3Com, 1999 Del. Ch. LEXIS at *14–15.  
 177. Compare In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 138 (describing Charles Prince’s non-
disparagement, non-compete, and non-solicitation agreements), with Growbow, 539 A.2d at 184 
(describing H. Ross Perot’s silence and non-compete provisions of a repurchase of his stock). 
 178. SORKIN, supra note 9, at 161 (demonstrating the need for companies to keep executives 
on noncompete agreements).  
 179. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d at 138.  
 180. See supra note 132 and accompanying text. 
 181. See supra Part V.A. 
 182. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.  Postorivo v. AG Paintball Holdings, Inc., 
2008 WL 553205, at *4–5 (Del. Ch. 2008) (“Because a derivative action, by its very nature, 
impinges on the managerial freedom of directors, Chancery Rule 23.1 operates as a threshold to 
insure that plaintiffs exhaust intracorporate remedies and protect against strike suits.”). See also 
Lewis v. Vogelstein, 699 A.2d 327, 339 (Del. Ch. 1997) (“[I]t cannot be the case that allegations 
of the facts of any (or every) transaction coupled with a statement that the transaction constitutes a 
waste of assets, necessarily states a claim upon which discovery may be had; such a rule would, in 
this area, constitute an undue encouragement to strike suits.”). 
 183. Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811–12 (Del. 1984). 
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the transaction constitutes waste meets the pleading standard, strike suits 
would be unduly encouraged.184  Although it is unclear whether the holding 
of Citigroup changed the waste standard for good or whether this more 
relaxed approach was a rare exception,185 lawsuits over executive 
compensation have been on the rise.186 The language of the plaintiffs’ 
complaint simply states that a departing CEO will receive a large bonus 
despite major problems within the company, and that such a compensation 
agreement is so one-sided that it could not have been made in good faith.187  
Given that many CEOs lost their jobs during the financial crisis and were 
paid significant severance packages,188 there will be ample opportunity for 
shareholders of other corporations to draft similar complaints against CEOs 
with severance agreements.189 Shareholders will surely take notice of the In 
re Citigroup decision and be encouraged to file derivative actions.190 
 
 184. Lewis, 699 A.2d at 339. 
 185. Broc Romanck & Dave Lynn, Delaware Dismisses Caremark Claims against Citigroup: 
CEO Pay “Waste” Claim Survives, THE CORPORATE COUNSEL.NET BLOG (Mar. 3, 2009), 
http://www.thecorporatecounsel.net/blog/archive/002030 html. 
 186. Paul R. Bessette et al., Executive Bonuses Triggering Lawsuits Nationwide, THE 
NATIONAL LAW JOURNAL, (Apr. 6, 2009), http://www.law.com/jsp/article.jsp?id=1202429689471 
(last visited Nov. 20, 2009).  See also Executive Compensation Under Fire, GREENBERG 
TRAURIG, LLP,  http://www.gtlaw.com/NewsEvents/Publications/Alerts?find=115034 (last visited 
September 16, 2010) (warning clients in an online memo discussing Citigroup: “don’t be 
surprised if many more companies face similar challenges to executive compensation decisions in 
the near future”). 
 187. Plaintiffs’ Consolidated Second Amended Derivative Complaint ¶ 212–13, Aug. 21, 2008. 
 188. See, e.g., Craig Harris, Fired CEO to get cash payout from Starbucks, SEATTLE PI (Jan. 
28, 2008), http://www.seattlepi.com/business/349081_sbux29 html; Jonathan Berr, Before Getting 
Fired, Wachovia CEO Thompson Got Gobs of Money, (June 2, 2008), 
http://www.bloggingstocks.com/2008/06/02/before-getting-fired-wachovia-ceo-thompson-got-
gobs-of-money. 
 189. Indeed, many corporations fire their executives (or pressure them to step down) because 
the company has suffered losses.  Dan Fitzpatrick et. al., Thain Ousted in Clash at Bank of 
America, WALL ST. J., Jan. 23, 2009, at A1 (describing the ouster of John Thain from Merrill 
Lynch due to large losses).  If they are unable to negotiate agreements with those executives 
during that process for fear of shareholder suits, they will likely be limited in their ability to find 
better management at the most critical times in the life of the corporation.  Cf. Jonathan Weisman 
& Joann S. Lublin, Obama Lays Out Limits on Executive Pay, WALL ST. J., Feb. 5, 2009, at A1 
(reporting on concerns that government intervention into corporate boardrooms might have 
blocked the filling of vital jobs in troubled companies). 
 190. See Bessette, supra note 186 (warning clients in an online memo discussing Citigroup: 
“don’t be surprised if many more companies face similar challenges to executive compensation 
decisions in the near future”). 
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C. The Court’s Apparent Preference for Compensation Tied to Long-Term 
Corporate Gain is an Unnecessary Intrusion on Board Decision-
Making 
Corporate advisors have taken notice of this decision,191 and have been 
advising the corporate world to ensure that they make a reasonable, well-
documented process for making compensation decisions and tie 
compensation to long-term performance rather than short-term performance 
metrics.192  If the Chancery Court intended to influence corporate behavior 
or vindicate popular opinion,193 its holding in Citigroup was unnecessary194 
and problematic.195 
Although executive compensation grew to unprecedented levels in the 
years leading up to the credit crisis,196 the court’s holding was an 
unnecessary step toward correcting those perceived problems, particularly 
in light of the negative impact the decision will have on the business 
community.197  The credit crisis and ensuing recession were precipitated by 
a massive bubble in the housing market.198  The risks taken during that 
period, and the profits reported during those periods, revealed themselves to 
be the result of irrational and irresponsible market behavior rather than real 
gains in market value.199  It is only logical that executive compensation 
would reach unprecedented heights during a period where financial markets 
reach similarly unprecedented levels. The court’s decision, which will 
create new fear of liability and intrude on board decision making, was 
 
 191. See Biles & Davis, supra note 141.    
 192. Washington’s New Limits on Executive Compensation, PAUL HASTINGS STAY CURRENT 
(Paul Hastings, Washington, D.C.) Feb. 2009, at 1–4, available at 
http://www.paulhastings.com/assets/publications/1205.pdf?wt mc_ID=1205.pdf (advising clients 
to be proactive in order to placate the American public, Congress, and the public by avoiding 
short-term incentive compensation, among other things). 
 193. See Biles, supra note 141 (stating that “[c]ourts are not immune to political zeitgeist” in 
reference of the Chancery decision in Citigroup). 
 194. See infra notes 201–03 and accompanying text (demonstrating that corporations are being 
advised to address executive compensation issues in response to pressure from the public, 
Congress, and the executive branch). 
 195. See supra Part V.B. 
 196. See supra note 43. 
 197. See supra Part V.B. (demonstrating that the Citigroup decision will raise the threat of 
strike suits). 
 198. See supra Part III.A. 
 199. See Elson, supra note 43 (“The value that many superpaid CEO superstars supposedly 
created has largely disappeared. . . the very profits that many of the companies reported appear to 
have been the product more of auditors’ imaginations than of any CEO’s strategy for seizing or 
creating value.”). 
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unnecessary in light of the fact that the corporate executive labor market is 
itself a bubble that is apparently popping.200 Mounting political pressure,201 
changes in corporate culture,202 and the deflated market are bringing down 
levels in executive pay.203  Before undermining the business judgment rule, 
the court should have considered those factors and recognized that its 
contribution to the deflation of executive pay was not necessary. 
The court’s ruling, which will have the effect of influencing 
corporations to tie compensation to longer-term measures of corporate 
success,204 raises a number of questions: what kind of compensation 
structure will satisfy the court? Should the court have such an impact on 
compensation decisions? Will that effect have an adverse impact on 
executive willingness to take risks? Will tying compensation to long-term 
corporate success help prevent another crisis?  
It is unclear what kinds of compensation structures will satisfy the 
Delaware Court of Chancery after its decision in Citigroup.205 The court 
allowed a claim to survive a motion to dismiss where Citigroup paid a 
departing CEO despite his alleged responsibility for the failures of the 
company, and corporate advisers now recommend that compensation 
agreements should tie reward to long-term measures of corporate 
success.206  The problem with this recommendation is that the same stock 
 
 200. See Don Pittis, Popping the Executive Compensation Bubble, CBCNEWS, Feb. 5, 2009, 
http://www.cbc.ca/money/story/2009/02/05/f-pittis-ceocompensation html (“The collapse of the 
Wall Street banks has poked an enormous hole in the idea of merit pay and perquisites.”); James 
Saft, Is the Executive Pay Bubble Popping?, REUTERS BLOG (Jan. 28, 2009, 7:59 PM), 
http://blogs reuters.com/great-debate/2009/01/28/is-the-executive-pay-bubble-popping 
(demonstrating the link between the housing bubble and executive compensation).   
 201. See Poerio, supra note 192 (noting pressure from Washington on TARP and non-TARP 
executive pay).   
 202. In the late 1990s the attitude toward executive compensation was that  
The best bargain is an expensive CEO. . . You cannot overpay a good CEO and you 
can’t underpay a bad one.  The bargain CEO is one who is unbelievably well 
compensated because he’s creating wealth for the shareholders.  If his compensation is 
not tied to the shareholders’ returns, everyone’s playing a fool’s game. 
Elson, supra note 43.   
 203. See e.g., Susanne Craig & Matthias Rieker, Goldman Bows on CEO Pay—Blankfein’s 
Take for 2009 is Half of Rival’s at J.P. Morgan, Amid Public Uproar, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 2010, 
at A1 (reporting that Goldman Sachs CEO Lloyd Blankfein would be getting a significantly 
smaller annual bonus in response to public pressure over pay).  
 204. See Biles & Davis, supra note 141. 
 205. See id. (“The Citigroup decision may mark the beginning of a new era in Delaware 
business jurisprudence.”). 
 206.  See id. 
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option207 plans that attempted to tie executive payment to corporate success 
are now being blamed for encouraging executives to take too much risk.208  
The irony of this result is that stock option plans were favored because they 
aligned the interests of executives, who were typically risk-averse, and 
shareholders, whose appetite for risk is high.209 Some commentators 
suggest tying a higher proportion of bonuses to longer term measures of 
success and to allow “clawbacks” of bonuses earned on deals that later 
reveal themselves to be unsuccessful.210 
The impact of the court’s decision is contrary to a key purpose of the 
business judgment rule, which is to recognize that managers and directors 
should decide how their company will “maximize shareholder value in the 
long term by taking risks without the debilitating fear that they will be held 
personally liable.”211 The business judgment rule seeks to protect risk 
takers, not consider how much risk they should have taken.212  Ultimately, 
the financial crisis was less likely caused by the fact the corporate 
executives took on too much risk and more likely caused by the fact that so 
many took the same risk, as is characteristic in market bubbles.213  In 
irrational market conditions, even the prospect of going uncompensated has 
proven to not be enough to stop extreme risk taking.214  Lehman Brothers 
provides a powerful example of a highly-respected investment bank with an 
extreme appetite for risk going bankrupt despite the fact that the company 
compensated its executives (and all of its employees) based on long-term 
 
 207. A stock option is the right to purchase shares of a company at a certain price at a certain 
date in the future.  See ZANDI, supra note 23, at 1554.     
 208. See SORKIN, supra note 9, at 534. See also Editorial, Bankers and their Salaries, supra 
note 52, at A18 (quoting the Institute of International Finance) (arguing that bankers should have 
more of their own money at risk because the compensation schemes of some firms “exacerbated 
the weaknesses and contributed to the market turmoil”). 
 209. Roshan Sonthalia, Comment, Shareholder Voting on All Stock Option Plans: An 
Unnecessary and Unwise Proposition, 51 UCLA L. REV. 1203, 1207 (2004). 
 210. Roy C. Smith, Greed is Good, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7, 2009, at W1. But see Miriam A. 
Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures in an Era of Excessive 
Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 96 MINN. L. REV. 368, 390–91 (2009). 
 211. In re Citigroup, 964 A.2d 106, 139 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 212. See id. at 122 (quoting In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d at 967–68) 
(noting that the business judgment rule does not look to the content of the board decision apart 
from consideration of the good faith or rationality of the process employed and that degrees of 
substantive error in the decision are not relevant). 
 213. See FERGUSON, supra note 11, at 121–22, 271 (demonstrating that the housing bubble and 
subsequent financial crisis were the result of a typical bubble). 
 214. See, e.g., infra notes 215–16 and accompanying text. 
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measures of success.215  Such a payment scheme was not enough to stop the 
company’s executives from being a major participant in leveraged and risky 
speculative investment in real estate securities.216 
VI. CONCLUSION 
By denying Citigroup’s motion to dismiss, the Delaware Court of Chancery 
strayed from the typically rigorous pleading requirements and substantive 
rule for making a claim of waste for corporate executive compensation 
decisions.217  This holding has signaled to corporate directors that the court 
will not always afford executive compensation decisions the same level of 
deference that it does other business decisions.218  This departure will lead 
to an increase in strike suits,219 and the court’s efforts to encourage 
corporations to tie compensation more closely to long-term performance 
will do more harm than good.220 
 
 
 215. See McDonald & Robinson, supra note 8, at 318 (demonstrating the impact of the failure 
of Lehman Brothers on its employees, whose bonuses came in the form of stock). See also 
William D. Cohan, Inside Dick Fuld’s Bunker, THE DAILY BEAST, (Dec. 3, 2009, 12:52 AM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2009-12-03/inside-dick-fulds-bunker (noting that 
Dick Fuld, CEO of Lehman Brothers, lost approximately $1 billion in net worth as a result of the 
Lehman collapse). 
 216. See McDonald & Robinson, supra note 8, at 135–36 (demonstrating Lehman Brothers’ 
participation in the highly risky CDO market in the midst of the real estate boom). 
 217. See supra Part V.A. 
 218. See supra Parts V.B–C. 
 219. See supra Part V.B. 
 220. See supra Part V.C. 
